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Abstract The paper addresses the issue of providing
access control via delegation and constraint manage-
ment across multiple security domains. Specifically, this
paper proposes a novel Delegation Constraint Manage-
ment model to manage and enforce delegation constraints
across security domains. An algorithm to trace the au-
thority of delegation constraints is introduced as well
as an algorithm to form a delegation constraint set and
detect/prevent potential conflicts. The algorithms and
the management model are built upon a set of formal
definitions of delegation constraints. In addition, a con-
straint profile based on XACML is proposed as a means
to express the delegation constraint. The paper also in-
cludes a protocol to exchange delegation constraints (in
the form of user commitments) between the involved
entities in the delegation process.
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1 Introduction
Delegation is a means for privilege or task provision
and distribution. Generally, delegation is considered as
a proxy process in which one entity makes available the
necessary rights to another entity to enable the receiver
to perform certain duties on their behalf while address-
ing specified obligations and meeting particular con-
straints. Over the delegation process, constraints such
as time, commitments, and organisational constraints
(such as separation of duty, binding of duty or least
privilege) must be applied. Constraints must be tracked
and administered by the involved authorities. The pro-
cess of tracking the propagation of tasks/privileges and
associated constraints within a single security domain
can be conveniently controlled and therefore, can guar-
antee a high level of confidence in terms of security.
However, when dealing with cross security domain trans-
actions (as happens in collaborative activities in grid
computing or intensive interactions in cloud computing
environments), this process becomes a non-trivial issue.
The difficulty of tracking constraints and authorisation
creates potential uncertainty for the involved authori-
ties about the knowledge of how the delegator and the
delegatee distribute the authorisation.
This paper addresses this concern by proposing a
the novel Delegation Constraint Management model.
The model provides a mechanism to capture the rela-
tionship of delegation transactions and involved con-
straints which are not effectively addressed by the ex-
isting approaches (as identified later in the paper). The
Delegation Constraint Management model is designed
to form an integral part of the whole approach to the
problem of delegation across multiple security domains.
The model needs the support of another model to pro-
vide the constraint matching and filtering functionality.
2This capability is out of scope and will be described in
another paper.
The main contributions of this paper are:
– formal definitions for delegation constraints and an
administration model;
– an algorithm to trace the authority of delegation
constraint;
– an algorithm to form delegation constraint sets and
detect/prevent potential conflicts;
– a profile to express the delegation constraint based
on eXtensible Access Control Mark-up Language
(XACML);
– a protocol to exchange the delegation constraint be-
tween the involved entities in the delegation process;
– an illustration of the model via the case study.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 analyses issues with the existing approaches to
illustrate the motivation for the investigation. This sec-
tion also discusses the approach of designing the model.
Section 3 outlines the basics of the components of the
model. The section describes the necessary operations
for a delegation process and the associated types of
constraints. Section 4 focuses on the definitions of con-
straints, operations and functions to establish a formal
base for constructing the management mechanism. This
section is one of the major aspects of the model. Section
5 discusses the issue of constraint administration. This
section discusses the issue of authority and its impact
on the delegation transaction. This section includes an
algorithm to deduce potentially duplicated/conflicted
constraints and prevent them from being added into an
existing delegation constraint set. Section 6 discusses
the issues of delegation commitment as a special type
of constraint. Section 7 proposes a basic protocol to ex-
change the commitment to allow the involved entities in
the delegation transaction to achieve a common context
of the transaction. Section 8 discusses the issues of dele-
gation management and defines the procedure to deter-
mine the conditions in which delegation, re-delegation,
revocation and authorisation support operations can be
conducted. Section 9 proposes an extension to XACML
to express the delegation and constraint information.
This section also discusses how the model can be inte-
grated into XACML. Section 10 provides an informal
evaluation of the model against the assumptions and
the functional requirements. Section 11 concludes the
paper.
In this paper, the term federation is used to indi-
cate a group of security domains which can interact
(for example, collaborating or sharing resources) via
pre-define business and organisational negotiation in-
cluding security.
2 Problems, Motivation and Approach
In highly distributed environments such as cloud or grid
computing systems, it is often necessary for users from
one security domain to collaborate with others on differ-
ent security domains. This type of collaboration usually
results in a workflow or activities which are expanding
over the border between security domains. Within the
context of delegation, if a delegation is conducted by
a delegator to a delegatee on a different domain, there
are certain challenges in administering the transaction.
The issue is even more challenging if this delegation is
utilised as a base for another delegation (re-delegation)
to a third-party.
Specifically, concerning the issue of delegation and
constraint management, since the delegation transac-
tion is distributed across different security domains,
how can the constraints that control the delegation
process be maintained? It is expected that the system
authority of the original delegator must maintain the
state of the delegation process in order to correctly
authorise the access. Monitoring the state of the del-
egation transaction after it moves out of the original
domain is non-trivial. Tracking subsequent delegation
transactions and the involved constraints is a challenge
for the original system authority and the original dele-
gator. The issue is also a challenge for the intermediate
delegators as they may not possess the original author-
ity to fully control the re-delegation transactions. It is
also a challenge for the system authorities to recognise
and verify the authority of users who initiate the re-
delegation transactions? Especially, how will they mon-
itor and enforce the constraints issued by the interme-
diate delegators?
In the context of cross domain delegation, there are
a substantial number of studies that aim to address
these questions [1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16]. Most of those
models can partially address the issue of delegation con-
straints, especially concerning tasks with sequential ex-
ecution order. However, there are a number of situations
in which there is no efficient solution. Basically, most
models can, to some extent, address the issue of con-
straint creation and administration. The issue of track-
ing and enforcing constraints in cross domain delegation
are among the main issues which are partially addressed
by the eXtensible Access Control Mark-up Language
(XACML) Administration and Delegation profile [15]
and the related policy languages [12]. However, ulti-
mately, they are still open issues because none of the
existing approaches effectively allows the relationship
of two delegations to be defined.
These questions can not be fully addressed because
the current constraint management models can not cope
3with action flows expanding across multiple security do-
mains. The main reason is that when the delegation ac-
tivities move from one domain to another, the part of
the information associated with the delegation activi-
ties, such as delegation constraint set and the author-
ity of these constraints over the delegation activities is
moved and changed accordingly. It makes the constraint
monitoring impossible for the current models.
In fact, it should be noted that existing approaches
including recent developments such as X-FEDERATE
[7] or XACML v3.0 Administration and Delegation pro-
file [15] also provide certain capabilities to address these
issues. However, none of them can adequately address
the issues of maintaining and tracking delegation in
cross domain activities. The main reason is that most
of approaches do not have a model to track and main-
tain constraints associated with a particular delegation.
In case of X-FEDERATE and the XACML v3.0 Ad-
ministration and Delegation profile, tracking delegation
is a complex task that requires significant administra-
tion effort to deduce and construct a chain or group
of involved delegations for the purpose of, for example,
cascading revocation. Constraints are often expressed
separately and it is unclear how the constraints can be
exchanged when the transaction moves across security
domains. In addition, expressing the constraint inde-
pendently from delegation policies is an issue that leads
to inefficient management of constraints.
Such issues with existing approaches can be consid-
ered as the motivation for developing a new and bet-
ter solution. However, it is also important to point out
that the model in this paper, by no means, is considered
as a replacement for XACML or any other similar ap-
proaches. The model is expected to be able to integrate
into existing architectures and to work as a comple-
ment. Because the profile at the moment, there is no
profile to represent delegation constraint.
In summary, within the area of constraint adminis-
tration for cross security domain transactions, the above
questions represents two major problems which are not
fully addressed by the existing approaches as discussed
above.
– The lack of a monitoring model that can keep track
of and enforce the involved constraints when moving
across multiple security domains;
– The lack of a model to zero the root authority that
imposed the constraints on the delegation;
– The lack of a mechanism to allow users and author-
ities to communicate about the constraints of a par-
ticular delegation.
This paper focuses on addressing these issues by
providing a model for monitoring and tracing delega-
tion constraints when the delegation is shifting from
one security domain to another. The model is designed
to provide fine-granularity access control. The model is
expected to be able to address the issue of coarse gran-
ularity in delegation which may lead to the abuse of
authority via over provisioning of privileges. Since the
objective is to provide access control and relies on exist-
ing authentication services, the model is not designed
to guard against threats and attacks from entities out-
side the involved security domains. It is expected that
the model can prevent or limit the abuse of authority
from insiders which may be assigned more privileges
than necessary.
Another important aspect of the approach which
needs to be pointed out is that it does not attempt
to perform conflict resolution between constraints but
focuses on the aspect of conflict prevention. The idea
behind this approach is that if the authority utilises
the approach, potential conflicts from delegation trans-
actions can be prevented. The main question is how
the authority should deal with the conflicts caused by
legacy policies, constraints or other access control im-
plementations (the ones which are constructed before
implementing the approach)? This is a non-trivial ques-
tion. There are different ways to address this concern.
From the conflict resolution perspective, the model should
attempt to modify or discard certain involved policies
(for example, the ones with less senior authority) to re-
move the conflicts. However, the heterogeneity and au-
tonomous nature of cross domain activities make this
approach difficult and, in many cases, less secure. From
the security perspective, all involved factors (policies
or constraints) must be considered. If any one of them
are ignored due to the conflict resolution process, the
final decision can be potentially coarse grained (a re-
sult which the approach tries to avoid). In fact, certain
conflicts may not be resolved automatically by the ac-
cess control mechanism. Therefore, to preserve security,
conflict prevention is a more reasonable approach. With
the prevention approach, any conflicts caused by old or
legacy policies are identified and the process of fixing
the conflicts are put into a negotiation mechanism be-
tween the involved member domains of the federation.
The negotiation process is out of the scope of this pa-
per.
It is important to note that, for the purpose of de-
scribing the functionality of the model, the model is pre-
sented within the context of XACML by using XACML
access control model and XACML policy expression for-
mat. However, the objective of system independence re-
quires the design to be able to integrate to any access
control mechanism with limited modification in terms
of design and implementation. At the moment, XACML
expression format is chosen to be the means to carry
4constraints as well as any other access control related
information. The reasons lie in the richness of XACML
and its wide adoption.
3 Delegation Constraint Management Model
The ultimate objective of the model is to govern con-
straints that are associated with a specific delegation
transaction and provide support for an existing access
control architecture in terms of access control decision
making. The model needs to facilitate different types of
operations involving forming constraint chains to sup-
porting the decision making structure by feeding it with
appropriate information from the involved delegation
constraint set. The objective of this model is to address
the demand for a mechanism to express, create, main-
tain and track constraints as outlined in Section 2.
3.1 Operations
In broad terms, a delegation transaction involves the
following steps: initiating delegation or re-delegation,
receiving delegation, executing delegation and revoking
a current delegation. Therefore, the model focuses on
four major operations. An operation generally involves
four entities: the delegator, the delegatee, the local sys-
tem authority of the delegator and the local system
authority of the delegatee. Each operation forms a flow
on its own.
The four principal operations of a delegation trans-
action are:
– Delegation operation;
– Re-delegation operation (Indirect delegation);
– Revocation operation;
– Authorisation Support operation.
3.1.1 Delegation and Re-delegation operation
A delegation operation happens when the delegator wants
to delegate or is requested to delegate. A delegation op-
eration is conducted based on the following principles:
– Delegation constraints must be formed without any
conflict. A mechanism must exist to prevent or re-
solve potential conflicts.
– Delegation constraints must not be duplicated in
terms of effect. Effect-duplicated constraints must
be replaced by the one with higher authority in the
delegation constraint set. This principle ensures the
effectiveness of the access control mechanism by not
evaluating duplicated constraints.
– Delegation constraint authority must be traceable
and verifiable.
Therefore, in order to satisfy the above principles,
the delegation operation must follow the following steps:
– The delegator must retrieve all potentially involved
constraints set by the involved entities such as the
delegator, the delegatee, the service providers, and
the system authorities of the delegator and the del-
egatee.
– The operation must form the delegation constraint
set by collecting the involved constraints via con-
sulting a special mechanism to detect and remove
or resolve the conflicted constraints.
– The operation must allow the involved entities to
exchange the constraint so that the involved enti-
ties can get common knowledge of the delegation
constraint set (a convergence state).
– When the involved parties agree on the common
knowledge of the delegation constraint set, the del-
egation is finalised.
The re-delegation operation is a special case of the
delegation operation and so, has to follow similar prin-
ciples as the delegation operation. A re-delegation op-
eration must be based on an existing delegation and the
associated delegation constraint set. The only difference
is that the re-delegation operation must consider the
existing re-delegation constraints that were included in
the original (existing) delegation constraint set. A re-
delegation operation is initiated by the demand of a
delegatee to re-delegate all or part of the previous del-
egation to a third entity. Re-delegation is initiated to
form a part of indirect delegation set. It can be ini-
tiated by various entities. Similarly to the delegation
operation, the result of a re-delegation operation is a
complete delegation operation and the existing delega-
tion constraint set is expanded as a new constraint will
be added to the existing delegation constraint set.
Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 present the basic
flow diagram of the delegation operation and the spe-
cial case of re-delegation operation. The delegation op-
eration can be initiated by various entities. The result
of the operation is the completed delegation operation
(either creating a new policy or grant or transfer a to-
ken to the delegatee) and a delegation constraint set is
established.
3.1.2 Revocation operation
A revocation operation is initialised by the demand to
revoke a previous delegation to effectively cancel the
effect caused by the delegation. The result of the revo-
cation operation is that a specified delegation becomes
5Fig. 1 Delegation Flow.
Fig. 2 Delegation Operation.
ineffective and a part of the delegation constraint set is
removed or updated. Figure 4 presents the basic flow
diagram of the revocation operation.
The revocation operation must follow the following
steps:
– The authority that wants to revoke an existing re-
vocation must retrieve the existing delegation con-
straint set that is associated with the delegation in
revoking process.
– The authority needs to make sure that the revoca-
tion constraints are satisfied. Otherwise, the revo-
cation operation is terminated.
– Finally, the involved entities of the revoked delega-
tion must be notified.
Fig. 3 Re-delegation Operation.
Fig. 4 Revocation Operation.
3.1.3 Authorisation Support operation
An authorisation support operation is initialised by a
request of the involved authority which is, in turn, trig-
gered by an access request to a service of a delegatee.
The authorisation support operation forms a part of the
whole authorisation process of the access control au-
thority. Unlike other operations, the authorisation sup-
port operation is only initiated by the authority of a
domain (a service provider) which, in turn, is triggered
6Fig. 5 Authorisation Support Operation.
by an access request. The purpose of the authorisa-
tion support operation is to allow the authority to get
an understanding about certain constraints that can be
applied to the delegation and the usage of the delega-
tion, in the context of the access request. The result
of the authorisation support operation is the contex-
tual information which the authority can use to sup-
port the access control decision making process. Figure
5 presents the basic flow diagram of the authorisation
support operation.
The authorisation support operation must follow
the following steps:
– The authority retrieves the existing delegation con-
straint set that is associated with the delegation in
the access request.
– The authority needs to make sure that the applica-
ble constraints are verified by tracing their author-
ity. The action of tracing authority is to determine
the original (root) authority that issued the involved
constraints.
– Finally, a set of applicable constraints is returned to
the service provider. This set of constraints can be
a subset of the delegation constraint set.
The Authorisation Support operation does not in-
volve modification of a delegation constraint set. The
operation is only concerned with feeding the informa-
tion of the constraint set for a delegation transaction
into appropriate policy decision points for evaluation.
3.2 Delegation Constraint
Delegation is considered as a technical mechanism to
propagate and coordinate tasks through the organisa-
tion or across multiple organisations. This includes the
delegation of the necessary responsibility/capability to
perform the necessary tasks. Any delegation must be
subject to certain constraints. In this paper, constraints
are considered as controls and boundaries which are
placed upon an organisation, a structure or a process.
Thus, constraint is understood as a set of controls and
boundaries which are placed upon a set of operations in-
volving certain users with certain attributes. Delegation
constraint is understood as any constraint involved in
the delegation process. This section discusses the types
of constraint which may be applied for a specific dele-
gation process.
In addition, it is important to point out that a policy
and a constraint can be expressed with the same policy
language such as XACML. However, a constraint is not
a policy. A constraint is considered as an extra part of
a policy providing additional boundaries to govern how
the policies should be enforced. For example, if a policy
is construct to say that “an underwriter can approve an
insurance contract”, then a constraint can be included
to further express that “if the value of the contract is
more than $10,000 USD, then it needs further approval
of a senior underwriter”.
Generally, delegation constraints can be divided into
the following categories:
– Delegation Initiation constraint;
– Re-delegation Initiation constraint;
– Delegation Receiving constraint;
– Execution constraint;
– Revocation constraint.
Delegation Initiation constraint is the type of
constraint that governs how delegation can be initiated.
Initiation constraint is the type of constraint to spec-
ify the group of entities which are eligible to conduct
the delegation. Based on the users’ attributes and the
nature of the operation, users may or may not not be
allowed to conduct the delegation. This type of con-
straint must be enforced by the authority, either when
conducting the delegation or when verifying the access
request using the delegation. For example, within the
context of XACML Administration and Delegation pro-
file [15], they are the constraints which affect how the
user-issued policies are created and maintained. Actu-
ally, this type of constraint is designed to address two
issues: the boundaries in which a specific user is eli-
gible to initiate a specific delegation transaction and if
so, how the delegation should be governed (for example,
optimistic or non-optimistic).
Re-delegation Initiation constraint is the type
of constraint that governs the re-delegation process.
The criteria of re-delegation is inherited from the del-
egation initiation constraint. In other words, a user
7is only eligible for re-delegation if it is qualified as a
potential delegator (satisfied delegation initiation con-
straint). Similar to delegation constraint, the re-delegation
constraint is also subject to certain additional controls
which are designed to govern the re-delegation process
which may include the conditions thereupon how re-
delegation can be initiated or how the policies of re-
delegation can be issued.
Delegation Receiving constraint is the type of
constraint to specify the conditions and boundaries in
which a specific group or an entity (delegatees) is eli-
gible for the delegation. Receiving constraints are nec-
essary because users within a organisation may have
different attributes (for example, education background
or work history or technical skills) and therefore, only a
subset of employees may be qualified to perform the del-
egated task. In an optimistic delegation, the delegator
may not want to check this type of constraint. However,
if the checking is mandatory, this type of constraint
must be enforced. By using this type of constraint, it
is possible to predict the set of potential delegatees
against a specified operation. This type of constraint
can be used by the system authority (such as service
provider) to limit the access by delegation.
Execution constraint is the type of constraint
that governs how the tasks involved with the delega-
tion (using delegation credential or delegation policies)
can be conducted or how the delegated credential can be
used, for example, constraints on task execution, depen-
dencies between tasks, individual commitment related
to the delegation process or contextual information of
the tasks and requests. Within the context of XACML
Administration and Delegation profile [15], they are the
constraints which affect how the user-issued policies
should be authorised and enforced. Constraints of this
type can be used in many different cases. These con-
straints involve organisational control principles such
as separation of duty and supervision. It is also possi-
ble to use this type of constraint to govern what kind
of attributes, policies, or resources are eligible for dele-
gation via restricting the ways in which delegation can
be used in execution.
Execution constraint assessment and enforcement
can be triggered by a specific event, for example, a
constraint can be set against the maximum delegation
depth to govern the re-delegation process. By allowing
the event-triggered execution constraint, constraints for
workflow can also be accommodated. For example, a
constraint can be set to initiate delegation if the work-
load of the delegator is higher than a predefined level.
In addition, other organisational constraints can be also
facilitated, for example, separation of duty.
Revocation constraint is the type of constraint
that governs how the revocation process can be done.
For example, within the context of XACML Adminis-
tration and Delegation profile [15], they are the con-
straints which affect how the user-issued policies are
deleted (if the deletion of policy is considered as the re-
vocation method). Revocation constraints can act as a
means to enforce the delegatee to comply with certain
obligations. For example, a constraint can be set to as-
sert that revocation can only be done if the workload is
lower than a pre-defined threshold and a specific task
is done by the delegatee.
These four types of constraints are applied for the
above four operations. Initiation constraints and Re-
ceiving constraints target the Delegation operation. Re-
delegation operation may involve Re-delegation con-
straints and Receiving constraint. Revocation constraints
are for the Revocation operations. Finally, the Execu-
tion constraints are applied for the Authorisation Sup-
port operation. It should be noted that the term delega-
tion constraint is used as a generic term for any type of
constraint which is associated with a delegation trans-
action. This term is not associated with a particular
type of constraint.
3.3 Model Components
The four operations require a solid foundation with for-
mal definitions of delegation constraints and two critical
functions: delegation constraint conflict prevention and
delegation constraint authority reduction. The opera-
tions also require a mechanism to exchange the dele-
gation constraints and a means to carry the delegation
constraint information. Therefore, the model is based
on five major components:
– Delegation Constraint Definitions: The formalised
definitions are designed to set the foundation for
the model.
– Delegation Constraint Authority Reduction Algo-
rithm: The algorithm plays an important role as it is
the means to trace the root authority of the delega-
tion constraints associated with a particular delega-
tion transaction and provide the ability to trace the
delegation constraints when the delegation transac-
tion moves from one security domain to another.
The algorithm provides the ability to capture the hi-
erarchical relationship of authority of the constraint
issuers.
– Delegation Constraint Conflict Prevention Algorithm:
The algorithm is designed to detect the potential
conflicts caused by the change of delegation con-
straints (for example, adding more constraints or
8change of authority) when the delegation transac-
tion moves from one security domain to another.
– Delegation Constraint Exchange Protocol: The pro-
tocol is designed to provide a foundation for the
service provider, the delegator, the delegatee and
their system authority to exchange and verify the
delegation constraints.
– XACML-based Delegation Constraint Profile: The
model also provides an extension of XACML named
Delegation Constraint Profile to provide a means
for carrying information concerning delegation con-
straints and transactions.
The following sections will describe the above com-
ponents in more detail.
4 Delegation and Constraint Definitions
This section presents a set of definitions to establish
a formal foundation for the subsequent algorithms of
the delegation constraint management model. The ap-
proach to define constraints by looking at the relation-
ships of the constraint and the involved entities in the
delegation process and the relationships between con-
straint’s elements. This type of approach (or similar)
has been used by many models [2, 3, 4]. In this paper,
the approach is suitable as it aligns with the principal
objective of the research which is to define and recog-
nise the relationship between the constraints, their el-
ements and the binary relations between the elements
and between the constraints. In this paper, in addition
to the nature of a constraint, the relationship between
a constraint and another is a vital aspect to provide the
basis for management and administration.
4.1 Constraints
In this section, issues involved with the delegation con-
straint definition are formalised. As discussed above,
constraints are considered as boundaries set by certain
controls over a process, a structure or an entity un-
der certain conditions. Generally, a constraint is defined
by its relationship with various organisational entities
which are, in turn, placed within certain hierarchical
structures. These entities, therefore, maintain certain
ordered relationships. Due to the ordered nature of or-
ganisational hierarchies, not all but a significant propor-
tion of such relationships follow a binary relation which
indicates that one entity of the hierarchy is more senior
than the other or in another word, precedes the other.
Because of this phenomenon, principals, sub-principals,
constraint targets or boundaries can be treated as ele-
ments of partially ordered sets (posets).
Definition 1 (Constraint Definition) Let P be a poset
of principals which have the authority to issue constraints
and SP be a poset of sub-principals which intend to re-
ceive a delegation from a principal from P . It is denoted
that TR is a poset of targets which a constraint can be
placed upon and B is a poset of boundaries for such
constraint. A constraint c ∈ C is defined as a 4-tuple
of:
c = {p, sp, tr, b} . (1)
Therefore a constraint c placed upon a delegation d,
which the principal p intends to perform upon the sub-
principal sp and of which with boundary b is the limita-
tion for the constraint target tr (part of the delegation
d), can be represented by the following flow.
{p, sp, tr, b} → c→ d . (2)
In the definition above, p ∈ P is a set of involved
principals, sp ∈ SP is a set of sub-principals and tr ∈
TR is the constraint target. b is a statement which is
based on an expressive language using attributes, bi-
nary and numerical operators to define the acceptable
operational boundaries for the constraint targets. In ad-
dition to constraint target, this is an element which is
used to set the scope for a specific constraint. It is im-
portant to note that each constraint is associated with a
specified issuer (the principal p). The principal p repre-
sents the authority of the constraint. It should be noted
that the term principal means the principal of the con-
straint not the principal of the delegation transaction.
It is similar for the term sub-principal.
The general meaning of this statement is that a con-
straint over a specific target, for example an operation,
is formed based on the nature of the operation and the
boundaries placed upon the operation and the principal
and the sub-principal involved with the operation. The
constraint is applied for the users or resources involv-
ing the tasks and the delegation process involving these
users/resources. For example, if Alice (the principal p)
wants to impose that access to modify her data (the
constraint target tr) is only granted to her collabora-
tors (the sub-principal sp) who meet the requirement
of separation of duty (the boundary b). In this exam-
ple, the constraint target tr is an activity (modifying
data of Alice). In fact, the constraint target can be any
organisational entity such as a user, a group, a depart-
ment, a role or a workflow as well as data. It is also
important to note that the relationship of constraint
and delegation is subject to a mesh topology in which
a constraint can be placed upon different delegation and
multiple constraints can be used for a single delegation.
The concept of delegation and constraint is illustrated
in Figure 6.
9Fig. 6 Delegation and Constraint.
For example, the following constraint can be used
to limit the way in which Alice can issue policy so that
Bob can access to Alice’s Project ABC given that Bob
has the role higher than Team Leader and just for a
period of 30 days. There is no scope which means the
constraint would be enforced globally. In addition there
is no attribute involved because in this case, the policy
will define the attributes that are necessary for Bob to
receive the delegation.
c = {Alice,Bob, ProjectABC,
{(Role  TeamLeader), (Period ≤ 30days)}} . (3)
In many models, constraints are simply considered
as boundaries or a set of boundaries which defined con-
straints primarily as the relations between tasks and the
person that perform the tasks. In this paper, the notion
of constraint is utilised in a broader manner in which
a specific constraint is associated with the authority
of the issuer (the principal p). This approach aims to
recognise the difference in power of different authorities.
For example, a constraint issued by a normal user is less
powerful than the constraint issued by a system admin-
istrator. A constraint issued by a team member has less
authority than the constraint issued by the team leader.
Within the context of delegation, this arrangement al-
lows a constraint to be set by a third party (not by the
delegator). Via this approach, a constraint set by the
original delegator in a long delegation chain (via mul-
tiple re-delegation) can be effectively maintained and
enforced if necessary. This approach is still effective to
cope with the situation in existing common access con-
trol architectures such as RBAC [2, 3]. For example,
using this arrangement, it is possible for a system au-
thority to create a statement such as assuming that“role
r1 is more senior than role r2, role r1 can be delegated if
and only if the delegatee possesses role r2 and role r3 is
not eligible” to support separation of duty. A constraint
can be tailored to create different types of separation
of duty so that even the highly flexible separation of
duty such as the operational separation of duty can be
addressed. The structure of constraint is designed for
this purpose. Also, this can also be done via the modi-
fication of delegation tree which will be discussed later.
Definition 2 (Constraint Authority) Let C be a poset
of constraints and P be a poset of principals. A con-
straint authority au ∈ AU where AU ⊆ {P,C,`p} is
represented via a relation satisfying:
∀c ⊂ C ∀p1, p2 ∈ P , p1  p2 ∧ p2 `p c→ p1 `p c . (4)
`p represents authority of a constraint. p `p c means
that the constraint c is sponsored by the principal p. The
sponsorship can be made directly if the constraint c is
issued by the principal p or indirectly if the constraint
c is issued by a principal with less seniority than the
principal p. Within the context of this paper, the symbol
 is utilised to represent the seniority relationship. For
example, if principal p1 is more or equally senior to
principal p2, we denote p1  p2. Similarly, if p1 is the
constraint principal of c1, p2 is the constraint principal
of c2 and p1  p2, we say c1 dominates c2 (is more
senior) and we denote:
c1.au  c2.au . (5)
The constraint authority implies the seniority of the
constraint. The constraint authority rests with the prin-
cipal p. The constraint authority can only be as high as
the authority of its issuer (the principal). A constraint
can be specified without the principal p. In this case,
the authority of the constraint is considered as system
authority and have ultimate power. This arrangement
divides constraints into two categories:
– System Constraint: A constraint issued by system
authorities. A constraint of this type is considered
as the general and trusted constraint. A system con-
straint can be presented without a specific principal.
In this case, there is no need for zeroing the root au-
thority because, the authority is considered as the
federation authority by default. This type of con-
straint will play an important role in managing the
constraint set and in preventing potential conflicts
which will be discussed later in Section 5.
– User Constraint: Constraints issued by an organi-
sational entity (normally a specific user). The user
constraints must be identified by tracing the root
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authority associated with the user constraints for
the purposes of authorisation. This issue will be dis-
cussed later in Section 8.
Definition 3 (Constraint Target Scope) Let C be
a poset of constraints and TR be a poset of constraint
targets. A constraint target scope sctr ∈ SCTR where
SCTR ⊆ {TR,C,`tr} is represented via a relation sat-
isfying:
∀c ⊂ C ∀tr1, tr2 ∈ TR,
tr1  tr2 ∧ tr1 `tr c→ tr2 `tr c . (6)
`tr is utilised to define the relationship between a
constraint c and a target tr bounded by c. If tr1 is the
constraint target of c1, tr2 is the constraint target of c2
and tr1  tr2, we say that the constraint target of c1 is
broader than the constraint c2 and we denote:
c1.sctr  c2.sctr . (7)
The utilisation of the constraint target tr is, as men-
tioned above, to define the effective scope of a particu-
lar constraint. The constraint target governs the limita-
tion of the constraint’s power. The constraint target is
the element which imposes the scope of a specific con-
straint. The scope is used to for traceability purpose
and plays an important role which will be discussed
later in the related algorithms.
This element plays an important role. Depending on
the demand, a constraint can be set to govern a single
entity (a normal user), a group of entities (a team of
users, a department or a set of users involving a specific
activity or workflow). For instance, in the above exam-
ple, Alice can set the constraint not on the Project ABC
but only to users that are involved in the workflow of
delegating a specific task to Bob and Charlie’s group.
In this case, the statement can be modified as follows.
c = {Alice,Bob,Bob&CharlieDelegation,
{(Role  TeamLeader), (Period ≤ 30days)}} . (8)
The constraint target is, essentially, an organisa-
tional entity. In this paper, the constraint target is cat-
egorised into two levels:
– Federation level: The constraint scope covers federation-
wide entities such as a cross domain collaborative
group or a cross domain workflow.
– Domain level: The constraint scope covers entities
within a single domain such as departments, groups
or individual users.
Definition 4 (Constraint Sub-principal Scope) Let
C be a poset of constraints and SP be the poset of con-
straint sub-principals. A constraint object scope scsp ∈
Fig. 7 Organisational Hierarchy and Constraint Scope.
SCSP where SCSP ⊆ {SP,C,`sp} is represented via a
relation satisfying:
∀sp1, sp2 ⊂ SP ∀c ∈ C,
sp1  sp2 ∧ sp1 `sp c→ sp2 `sp c . (9)
`sp is utilised to define the relationship between a
constraint c and a sub-principal sp bounded by c. If
sp1 is the constraint sub-principal of c1, sp2 is the con-
straint sub-principal of c2 and sp1  sp2, we say c1 has
broader sub-principal scope than c2 and we denote:
c1.scsp  c2.scsp . (10)
Essentially, the constraint scope (target or sub-principal)
should be organised into a specific hierarchy. Scope is
used in order to allow the traceability and compara-
bility between the entities within the hierarchy. The
implications of scope will be discussed later in Section
5. Figure 7 presents the constraint scope in relation to
the organisational structure.
Definition 5 (Constraint Restrictiveness) Let C be
a poset of constraints and B is the poset of constraint
boundaries. A constraint restrictiveness re ∈ RE where
AU ⊆ {B,C,`b} is represented via a relation satisfy-
ing:
∀b1, b2 ⊂ B ∀c ∈ C, b1  b2 ∧ b1 `b c→ b2 `b c . (11)
`b is utilised to define the relationship between a
constraint c and a boundary b defined by c. If b1 is the
constraint boundary of c1, b2 is the constraint boundary
of c2 and b1  b2, we say c1 is more restrictive than c2
and we denote:
c1.re  c2.re . (12)
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The meaning of the statement b `b c is that a bound-
ary b is placed upon the constraint target of constraint
c. The definition above is designed to express the re-
strictiveness of the involved constraints by saying if
c1  c2, then c1 is a more restrictive delegation con-
straint or in other words, c2 is less restrictive than c1.
This definition is designed to capture the relationship of
boundaries of the involved constraints in the delegation
process.
Definition 6 (Constraint Relatedness) Two constraints
are said to be related to each other if they satisfy at
least one of the relationships defined in Definition 2,
3, 4, and 5. In this case, assuming that c1 has higher
authority and/or wider scope, we denote:
c2 |= c1 . (13)
If this requirement is not met, we say c1 6= c2. If this
is the case, then it is said that c1 and c2 are independent
constraints.
It is worth noting that the notion of constraint is
based on the poset of its elements (principal, sub-principal,
target and boundary). Therefore, essentially, a constraint
set is a poset. In a delegation transaction, it is common
that a delegatee (a sub-principal) is subject to more
than one constraint. For administrative purposes, the
involved constraints need to be grouped together. In
fact, the set formed by these involved constraints is
still a poset. However, within the poset, there may be
certain constraints that are similar in the sense that
they share the same principals/sub-principals/targets
or or principals/sub-principals/targets in the same hi-
erarchy. As defined in Definition 6, these subsets of con-
straints are related and comparable. These subsets are
totally ordered sets and can be formed into chains. A
delegation transaction may be subject to one or more
chains. The constraint chain is used to form the means
for transferring and tracing constraint authority.
Definition 7 (Constraint Chain) Given σ ∈ C∗ is
a poset, σ = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} is a constraint chain if
∀{i, k} ∈ [1, n], ci |= ck . (14)
Essentially, a constraint chain is formed by only de-
pendent constraints. Constraints within a chain share
common elements (same element or elements within
the same hierarchy) such as authority, target or object.
A constraint chain is formed by taking one constraint
and scanning the whole set of potentially involved con-
straints. A constraint can be added into an existing
chain by evaluating against the elements of the chain.
This process guarantees that the chain is formed around
a common element. As a result of the procedure, there
will be more than one chain which can be formed. In
the example in which Alice places constraints upon a
delegation transaction with Charlie and Bob, there can
be more than one constraint chain, for example, one
for Bob, one for Charlie and one for Project ABC. The
procedure to form constraint chains will be discussed in
the next sections.
A delegation constraint chain is the means to de-
scribe multiple restrictions on a delegation transaction.
This is designed for multiple direct delegation to form
an indirect delegation. The reduction of authority pro-
cedure greatly depends on the hierarchy of the author-
ity, scope and the structure of the constraint chain.
Definition 8 (Constraint Reducibility) Given a del-
egation transaction and σ = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} is a subset
of the constraint poset of this transaction, σ is said to
be reducible if
∃{i, k} ∈ [1, n],
ci.au  ck.au ∨ ck.scsp  ck.scsp ∨ ci.sctr∨  ck.sctr . (15)
This definition is designed for two purposes. It can
provide the basis for the test for forming a constraint
chain. It also can be used to check whether a con-
straint is duplicated fully or partially with any exist-
ing constraints. The definition checks whether a con-
straint shares any common element with any existing
constraint. The common element can be principal (au-
thority), sub-principal (sub-principal scope) or constraint
target (target scope).
4.2 Operations, Functions, Predicates and Hierarchy
As an operation is governed via different predicates
(which will be discussed below), a constraint applied
for a specific operation will also be applied for the op-
eration’s predicates. Similarly, a constraint applied for
a specific operation will also be applied for its sub-
operations. The concept of sub-operation (operations
at lower level in the hierarchy) will also be discussed in
this section.
A delegation transaction is centered around the fol-
lowing functions: issue for delegation via issuing new
policy, grant for grant delegation and transfer for trans-
fer delegation. As discussed before, transfer delegation
is rare in the real world. However, it is included in
the model for the sake of completeness. In addition to
these three operations, two other operations revoke and
execute are also necessary for revocation and execution
of the an existing constraint. It is important to note
that each issue, transfer or grant function represents
a delegation transaction. In other words, a delegation
d is represented as a function of f , d(f). As the proxy
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of the delegation operations, each function is associ-
ated with a poset of constraints. We denote d.do and
d.de are the delegator and delegatee of the delegation
d. Similarly, we denote d.po and d.at are the policy and
attribute associated with the delegation d.
These functions form the basis for the whole dele-
gation process and are structured as follows:
– issue(do, de, po): The delegator do performs a del-
egation via issuing a policy or a set of policies po
which allows the delegatee de to achieve the dele-
gation objectives. This function can be invoked via
the Delegation or Re-delegation operation.
– grant(do, de, at): The delegator do performs a dele-
gation via granting an attribute or a set of attributes
at to the delegatee de which allows the sub-principal
to achieve the delegation objectives. This function
can be invoked via the Delegation or Re-delegation
operation.
– transfer(do, de, at): The delegator do performs del-
egation via transferring an attribute or a set of at-
tributes at which allows the delegatee de to achieve
the delegation objectives. This function can be in-
voked via the Delegation or Re-delegation opera-
tion.
– revoke(do, de, at|po): A principal performs the revo-
cation on an existing delegation which the delegator
do performed over the delegatee de via the means of
the policy po or the attribute at. If the revocation is
conducted to cancel the delegation via issuing poli-
cies, the revocation renders the mentioned policy
ineffective, for example, by deleting the previously
issued policies if appropriate. This function can be
invoked via the Revocation operation.
– execute(do, de, at|po): The delegatee de performs an
execution utilising an existing delegation by utilis-
ing the delegated attribute at or the policy po. This
function can be invoked via the Authorisation Sup-
port operation.
In order to govern the operations with constraints, a
checking mechanism is necessary. To provide the check-
ing function, the model provides a set of predicates
for each type of function. The predicate is a Boolean
function to check a specific function against a specific
boundary or a set of boundaries to form a constraint.
– canDelegate(func, b): This predicate is the general
predicate to govern delegation operation which em-
ploys the function func against the boundary b.
This predicate is not concerned with the specific
function (issuing policy, granting or transferring to-
ken). If the predicate is satisfied, the delegation trans-
action can proceed via any one of three aforemen-
tioned functions.
– canIssue(func, b): This predicate is set to govern
the function issue against the boundary b. Unlike
the predicate canDelegate, this predicate is only
set to check the issue function and is not valid if
combining with other functions. This predicate is
a senior class of canDelegate. The function issue
can be checked against this predicate directly or
via the more general (any more senior) predicate,
canDelegate.
– canGrant(func, b): This predicate is set to govern
the function issue against the boundary b. Unlike
the predicate canDelegate, this predicate is only
set to check the grant function and is not valid if
combining with other functions. This predicate is
a senior class of canDelegate. The function grant
can be checked against this predicate directly or
via the more general (any more senior) predicate,
canDelegate.
– canTransfer(func, b): This predicate is set to gov-
ern the function issue against the boundary b. Un-
like the predicate canDelegate, this predicate is only
set to check the transfer function and is not valid if
combining with other functions. This predicate is a
senior class of canDelegate. The function transfer
can be checked against this predicate directly or
via the more general (any more senior) predicate,
canDelegate.
– canReceive(func, b): This is a predicate that de-
termines if a user can receive the delegation. It is
necessary in the case of non-optimistic delegation.
As if this is the case, the delegator and/or the in-
volved authority want to know about the eligibility
of the delegatee regarding the involved delegation.
– canRevoke(func, b): This predicate is designed to
determine if a delegation can be revoked. The in-
clusion of the function func is for administration
purposes so that the information from the function
revoke can be used to assess against the boundary
b. This predicate is designed to support the function
revoke.
– canExecute(func, b): This predicate is designed to
check if a delegation can be used to contribute to
an authorisation decision making process.
Essentially, each delegation is represented by a pred-
icate. A predicate is a Boolean function which the value
(true or false) is the result when the constrains asso-
ciated with the delegation transaction are evaluated.
In other words, this arrangement means that if a del-
egation is allowed or honoured. Its predicate must be
checked and verified in which all associated constraints
must be verified and enforced. For example, the follow-
ing constraint states that Alice can delegate via issuing
policy po1 to Bob so that Bob can access Project ABC
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of Alice service given that the Bob has the role higher
than Team Leader and just for a period of 30 days.
canGrant{issue(Alice,Bob, po1), c}
where ct = {Alice,Bob, ProjectABC
{(Role  TeamLeader), (Period ≤ 30days)}} .
(16)
In this case, the principal of the constraint is the
same as the delegator. However, it can be possible that
the constraint is issued by the system authority. If that
is the case, then the above statement becomes (assum-
ing that the data of Project ABC is controlled by Access
Control Server):
canGrant{issue(Alice,Bob, po1), c}
where ct = {AccessControlServer,Bob, ProjectABC
{(Role  TeamLeader), (Period ≤ 30days)}} .
(17)
The model manages the operations and constraints.
These functions form the second level of the operation
hierarchy. The hierarchy is formed by two levels. The
senior level is the four operations discussed above in
Section 3.1. Figure 8 presents the hierarchical relation-
ships of the operations and the predicates. In terms of
constraint management, the hierarchy is introduced to
provide a means to capture the inheritance relationship
between the delegation transaction (the general oper-
ations) and a specific way in which the delegation is
conducted (the functions).The formal relationships be-
tween the functions, predicates and constraints will be
defined in the next section. Via this arrangement, dele-
gation via issuing policy and delegation via exchanging
token can be treated in the same way. In fact, a token
is just an abstract statement which can be described
in any policy languages such as XACML or Ponder. It
should be noted that the Authorisation Support oper-
ation is not associated with a predicate because it is
triggered by the service provider authority which is al-
ways authorised to do so. Therefore, in any cases, it is
always feasible to accommodate these two implementa-
tion via a uniform theoretical construct.
4.3 Delegation Tree and Authority Tree
Definition 9 (Delegation Tree) Given a delegation
tree δ ∈ D∗ and fk ∈ F, k = [1, n] is a set of the del-
egation functions, the delegation tree δ is a chain rep-
resented by a set of functions which are performed to
achieve the entire delegation. The order of a function
in the chain is determined by the seniority of the prin-
cipal that initiates that function.
δ = {f1, f2, . . . , fn} . (18)
Definition 10 (Authority Tree) Given a delegation
tree δ ∈ D∗ and pk ∈ P, k = [1, n] is a set of principals,
the authority tree α ∈ AU∗ is a chain of the authority
that perform the delegation transactions in the delega-
tion tree. The order of an authority in the chain is de-
termined by the seniority of the function that initiates
by that authority.
α = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} . (19)
The principal p1 on top of the tree is considered as
the authority of the whole delegation tree. It is said that
p1 is the root authority of the delegation tree and it is
denoted as δ.au = p1.
Based on the definition, it can be seen that the au-
thority tree is a reflection of the delegation tree. It is
a one-to-one mapping for each element of the two trees
as one function is initiated by one principal only. At
this point, it is important to distinguish the following
concepts:
– Constraint Authority: The authority of the principal
that issues the constraint.
– Delegation Authority: The authority of the princi-
pal that initiates the delegation via a corresponding
function.
– Delegatee Tree Authority (root authority): The au-
thority of the principal that initiates the original
delegation which is subsequently re-delegated by other
principals.
It is possible that in one delegation transaction, only
one principal has all three types of authority. However,
in most situations, the authorities can come from many
different principals. As showed in Figure 9, Alice pos-
sesses the authority of the whole delegation tree while
Bob only has authority for its own delegation (a re-
delegation from Alice). In the delegation transaction
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from Bob to Ernest, the constraint c1 is from the sys-
tem authority while c2, c3 and c4 are issued by Bob
(Bob is the constraint authority).
In this paper, it is important for the principal with
root authority to maintain a precise knowledge about
the current status of its delegation tree. If the root au-
thority rests with the system authority, the system au-
thority needs to maintain such knowledge.
5 Constraint Administration
In this section, the formal conditions for delegation, re-
delegation, revocation, and authorisation support oper-
ation are defined. The constraints are used to determine
if a delegation, a re-delegation or a revocation request
is authorised. The main issue is the management of the
delegation process. In addition, the issue of trust vs.
authority, constraint scope vs. effect and conflict pre-
vention are also discussed.
5.1 Assumptions
5.1.1 Transaction - Constraint Mapping
It is a non-trivial issue for the principal to retrieve con-
straints issued by the authorities due to the principal’s
lack of knowledge about the context and implications
of the delegation transaction. The assumption is that,
given a principal, a sub-principal and a target, the in-
volved authorities can provide the principal a set of con-
straints which are potentially applicable for the delega-
tion transaction. For example, if given Alice as the prin-
cipal, Bob as the sub-principal and Project ABC as the
target, the authority can tell Alice that this transaction
is potentially subject to separation of duty constraint.
This assumption is necessary to address the issue of re-
trieving and constructing constraint poset of a specific
delegation transaction in which the delegator and some-
times, the delegatee, must contact the potentially in-
volved authority to retrieve certain system constraints,
in addition to their own individual constraints. This
function should be addressed by existing approaches,
especially in the workflow area, such as Botha and Eloff
[8], Atluri and Warner [2] and Bertino et al. [5] or by
commercial Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) prod-
ucts such as SAP R/3, Oracle E-Business Suite or Mi-
crosoft Dynamics. As the model is designed to be a
complement for the existing approaches, the assump-
tion is arguably reasonable.
5.1.2 Common Hierarchy
Part of the purpose of the model is to evaluate con-
straints against each other based on the seniority of au-
thority (principal), scope of sub-principal and scope of
target. This is not a problem for evaluating constraints
within a security domain. With cross security domain
transactions, it is difficult to determine the seniority of
two elements from two different security domains. For
example, it is difficult to determine whether a Team
Leader from one domain is more senior than a Lead
Developer from another domain. It is caused by the het-
erogeneity of many factors such as security approach,
attribute expressiveness or organisational structure.
Achieving a common hierarchy for different security
domains is difficult and has been a long standing is-
sue. Usually, the common hierarchy is constructed via
the negotiation process when forming the federation or
when a new member domain joins the existing feder-
ation. The negotiation process is often considered as
part of the business logics of the federation, not access
control. Therefore, providing a solution for this issue is
not a concern of the paper and is out of scope. It is as-
sumed that there is an existing mechanism to provide
this capability.
5.2 Constraint Authority and Trust
As a delegation transaction can involve many delega-
tion steps, (which are collectively represented as a del-
egation tree) more than one authority may be involved.
Therefore, it is necessary to determine the level of trust
of the involved authorities. In addition, as previously
discussed, one of the notable contributions of the model
is the recognition of the authority of normal users so
that individuals can place certain constraints on their
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Issuer Action
Absent The constraint is senior and is combined as it is. It
is because the constraint in this case is considered
to be formed by the federation authority.
Present The constraint is subject to be removed if conflicts
with more senior constraints are found.
Table 1 Constraint Authority Evaluation Rule.
own information. The recognition of authority of nor-
mal users raises the demand for a mechanism to evalu-
ate and compare the authority of constraints.
There are two situations in which evaluation of au-
thority of constraints is necessary:
– Adding a new constraint to an existing constraint
set of a delegation tree: In this situation, the new
constraint is evaluated against other constraints to
determine whether there is an existing constraint
with similar effect but higher authority. This situa-
tion happens when the authority wants to achieve
conflict prevention between constraints.
– Performing Authorisation Support operation: This
situation usually involves an authorisation request
using a re-delegation. In this case, the authority has
to determine the root authority of the delegation
tree that the re-delegation is a part of (i.e. the orig-
inal delegator of the delegation tree).
Generally, there are three types of evaluation: sys-
tem constraint vs. system constraint, system constraint
vs. user constraint and user constraint vs. user con-
straint. It is easy to determine the result of the evalu-
ation of system constraints against user constraints as
system constraints are more trusted and will take prece-
dence. For constraints of the same type, constraints
with higher authority will take precedence. As a con-
straint issued by a senior authority is more trusted than
a constraint issued by a less senior authority, in case of a
conflict, a constraint associated with a senior authority
should take precedence. The constraint with less senior-
ity may be dropped (not added to the constraint set
associated with the delegation tree) and not enforced
(Table 1). In Section 4, the authority and seniority are
defined as the result of the constraint principal (the
issuer of the constraint).
5.3 Constraint Effect and Scope Reduction
As an instrument to prevent conflicted constraints from
being added into an existing constraint set, it is neces-
sary to have a mechanism to detect the related con-
straints which potentially yield similar or dissimilar ef-
fects. There are two main questions:
Cons-
traint
Principal Sub-
principal
Target Boundary
c1 Alice Bob Project
ABC
Access
only at
day
c2 Alice’s
partners
Bob’s de-
partment
Task 1 of
Project
ABC
Access for
1 week
only
Table 2 An Example Constraints with Potential Conflicts.
– Question 1: Under what conditions, should two con-
straints be considered for duplication testing?
– Question 2: Under what conditions, should a con-
straint be dropped in favour of another constraint?
With the way of structuring a constraint around
four elements: the principal, the sub-principal, the tar-
get and the boundary, Question 1 should be addressed
by considering the sub-principal and the target. It im-
plies the two constraints should be evaluated if they
have similar scopes. The first two elements are the two
factors which define the area of impact (the scope) of a
constraint. Therefore, two constraints c1 and c2 should
be tested for duplication if the following conditions are
satisfied.
{{c1.scsp  c2.scsp} ∧ {c1.sctr  c2.sctr}}∨
{{c1.scsp  c2.scsp} ∧ {c1.sctr  c2.sctr}} . (20)
To find an answer for Question 2 is more complex.
Assuming that two constraints have the same author-
ity, for the sake of security, the one which is more re-
strictive and broader in scope, should take precedence.
However, this setting can be changed as it is up to the
authority to determine the appropriate setting for its
environment. A constraint should only be dropped if
it directly contradicts another constraint with higher
priority and the same scope. Therefore, given two con-
straints, c1 and c2, c2 will be dropped if the following
conditions are satisfied.
{{c1.au  c2.au} ∧ {c1.scsp  c2.scsp}}∧
{{c1.sctr  c2.sctr} ∧ {c1.b  c2.b}} . (21)
However, there is not always a simple answer for
Question 2. For example, if c1 has broader sub-principal
scope but less target scope; and c2 has higher authority,
then there is no obvious answer for the reduction pro-
cess. In this case, both constraints should be evaluated.
The result is determined based on the combining rule
as discussed below.
Table 2 presents two constraints which are poten-
tially conflicted. In this example, if Bob requires access
to a file which is part of Task 1, what decision should be
made? In this paper, to address this issue, a conflict res-
olution technique of XACML can be adopted in which
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the principal with root authority of the delegation tree
(which the constraints are associated with) can specify
the way in which the conflict can be resolved. Specifi-
cally, a similar approach to the XACML’s combining al-
gorithms, namely deny-override, permit-override, first-
applicable and only-one-applicable, can be utilised [14].
For example, in Table 2, if the permit-override rule is
applied, it is considered as satisfied if either constraints
are met. In contrast, if the deny-override rule is ap-
plied, the combined effect is only for Bob and only for
Task 1 of Project ABC for 1 week and at day. It it
important to note that, similar to XACML, in a num-
ber of cases, it is not possible to achieve a combined
effect. In such cases, a conflict is reported. As XACML
allows users to define their own algorithms, new algo-
rithms for constraint scope and effect reduction are also
allowed. The usage of the combining algorithms will be
explained further in Section 9.
Algorithm 5.1 describes the procedure to evaluate a
constraint set and remove conflicted constraints based
on scope and effect reduction. The algorithm basically
compares a constraint in a set and if the conditions
are met, then the constraint can be added to the con-
straint set and replace the constraint that has less au-
thority and less scope. The algorithm is to achieve the
following main objective: preventing the conflicted con-
straints from being added into the delegation constraint
set. This algorithm is the key component to form the
delegation constraint set.
Algorithm 5.1: ScopeAndEffectReduction(σ, c)
Algorithm - Evaluate a constraint set and remove
conflicted constraints based on scope and effect.
input : A non-reducible delegation constraint set σ
and the new constraint c.
output : σ with c if c is not conflicted/duplicated.
foreach constraint ci ∈ σ do1
if {c.au  ci.au} ∧ {c.scsc  ci.scsc} ∧ {c.sctr 2
ci.sctr} ∧ {c.b  ci.b} then
σ = σ − ci3
σ = σ + c4
end5
end6
σ = σ + c7
return σ8
6 Delegation Commitment
In this section, the issue of delegation commitment is
considered. The commitment is a user-defined obliga-
tion which bounds the involved parties of the delegation
process. The commitment is complement to constraint
and can be considered as a special type of constraint.
6.1 User Commitment in the Delegation Process
In any delegation process, the delegation transaction is
approved or agreed by both parties only after both can
reach an agreement about the duties or responsibilities
of the involved parties. This is the constraint that the
user may want to impose on the delegation process. In
other words, this is the commitment of the users over
the delegation. The commitment of the involved parties
which can be understood as the course of action about
what they have to do before and after the delegation
takes place to actually complete the delegation process.
This forms an important aspect of delegation which is
not adequately addressed by many delegation models.
Consider the following example of the process for
preparation of a company’s annual report. The policy
of the organisation indicates that CEO is responsible
for preparing the report. But the CEO can delegate
part of the task of report preparation to the lower level
managers if necessary for example, Marketing Manager,
Financial Manager, and Technology Manager. These
managers, then, further delegate part of their tasks to
the lower level managers and subordinates. The delega-
tion allows the lower level managers access to certain
confidential documents to prepare the report. However,
the delegation comes with some conditions as the CEO
insists that that they only require access to the resource
three times for a period of one day. Therefore, in order
to complete the assigned task, the commitment of man-
agers (the delegatees) in this scenario is composed by
the following factors: access to the resource, only three
times and only valid for a period of one day. The com-
mitment of delegator in this scenario is to grant dele-
gation for three times and for one day. The CEO (the
delegator) can agree to perform a grant delegation if
they can reach that common commitment. The CEO,
then, may delegate similar access to an auditor from an
external organisation, to audit the company report at
a later stage.
The delegation commitment can include some con-
ditions and constraints on the delegation process no-
tably duration and service invocation times. However,
commitment does not only include constraints with re-
spect to roles/privileges or system constraints such as
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workload. Part of the commitment is the trusted re-
sponsibility, for example, activities which the delegator
believes that the delegatee will perform to effectively
comply with the delegation. An example for this type
of activity is that after each service invocation, the del-
egatee has to reduce the allowed number of service invo-
cation by one. This is important because it is often the
case that the delegated capabilities exceed what is ac-
tually necessary to perform or achieve the tasks. This
is the mismatch of granularity between the power of
the delegation token (a set of capability which the del-
egation token carries) and what the delegator actually
intends to allow. This is the delegatee’s commitment as
the delegator cannot monitor how the delegatee con-
trols the times of usage of the delegation assertion.
6.2 Delegation and Commitment
This section explains the conceptual issue of commit-
ment in the delegation process and the role of the in-
volved parties. It is assumed that each Service Provider
and delegators/delegatees in different security domains
have an Authorisation Authority. In addition, due to
the autonomous nature of federated systems, it is not
uncommon that the delegatee will come from a differ-
ent security domain and/or the delegator may not have
had prior contact with the delegatee. So from the trust
perspective, it is reasonable to assume that the del-
egator trusts the Authorisation Authority and Service
Provider more than the delegatee (recommended trust).
Figure 10 depicts a typical direct delegation with the
involvement of two entities in which an initial delega-
tor on domain D1 subsequently grants some necessary
privilege attributes to the delegatee on domain D2 to
allow access to the necessary service.
In any user delegation model, the delegated privi-
lege attributes are all or a subset of delegator’s privilege
attributes. The delegator manages to transfer or grant
these privilege attributes to the delegatee with some
constraints or conditions such as information about the
Service Provider, the service to be invoked or times and
duration of invocation. In our approach, some of those
conditions and constraints form the commitment of the
delegator, delegatee and other involved parties such as
the Service Provider. Making agreement on the commit-
ment and tracking the commitment are the first and the
last step of the delegation process. The commitments
should be expressed in a conventional form agreed by
both parties.
6.3 Pre-Delegation Commitment
The pre-delegation commitment phase focuses on the
constraints and conditions of the involved parties. For
the delegation to happen, the constraints and condi-
tions must be expressed clearly and exchanged to both
parties involved. As the delegation process in the paper
focuses on user delegation, the delegator will have the
authority upon the pre-delegation commitment negoti-
ation with the delegatee.
In the direct delegation process, from the delega-
tor’s perspective, the delegator will have to focus on
the following tasks:
– Checking the validity of delegation request and mak-
ing decisions regarding conditions and commitment
such as duration or access times.
– Forming delegator’s conditions and commitment.
– In some cases, the delegator has to negotiate the
conditions and commitment with the relevant Ser-
vice Provider and Authorisation Authority to notify
or verify with these parties about the commitment
of the delegatee.
From the delegatee’s perspective, if the delegation
request is accepted by the delegator, the delegatee also
has to complete the following duties to make the dele-
gation progress:
– Checking the validity of delegator’s assertion.
– Making decision regarding the conditions and com-
mitment set by delegator. Sometimes, if the original
request is changed by the delegator, the delegatee
must be aware and repeat the commitment negoti-
ation process.
From the Service Provider’s perspective, the pre-
delegation commitment is not particularly important
as they are not involved with the negotiation between
the delegator and the delegatee.
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6.4 Post-Delegation Commitment
After the delegatee receives the delegation assertion, it
must check the validity and determine whether to ac-
cept the delegation (after accepting the pre-delegation
commitment). Then the delegatee should have the abil-
ity to invoke the necessary services from the Service
Provider using the delegated attributes.
After these interactions, the involved parties need to
perform the post-delegation activities which primarily
keep track of the activities and conditions set by the in-
volved parties in the pre-delegation commitment nego-
tiation. A typical activity for post-delegation commit-
ment is to update delegation information of the involved
parties, especially delegator and delegatee to maintain
the consistency of the delegation status. Naturally, the
post-delegation commitment is quite simple in compar-
ison to the pre-delegation commitment.
From the Service Provider’s perspective, the only
task they have to do is to notify the delegator about
the request of the delegatee. Depending on the com-
mitments, the delegatee then may need to inform the
delegator that the delegation assertion was used so that
the delegator can finalise the process of keeping track
and monitoring the delegation transaction. The delega-
tor also needs to do some management tasks such as
updating information related to the delegation.
6.5 Pre-Delegation and Post-Delegation Commitment
in Indirect Delegation
In an delegation tree, the situation becomes more com-
plicated with the involvement of intermediate principals
who act as brokers between the original delegator and
final delegatee. Figure 11 illustrates an indirect delega-
tion where multiple delegations recursively happen to
form a delegation tree from the original delegator to
the final delegatee via multiple intermediate principals
which, in turn, act in the role of both delegator and
delegatee.
In Figure 11, there are n principals involved in the
delegation process. Except the first and the last princi-
pals which are respectively the delegator and delegatee,
all other entities will act in both roles. For example, in
the delegation chain, principal pk will accept some del-
egated privilege attributes from pk−1 to be a delegatee.
Principal pk, in turn, will transfer those privilege at-
tributes to pk+1 to effectively be a delegator. The final
delegatee pn will be the actual principal which asks for
the delegation from the beginning.
From the delegation commitment perspective, it is
quite difficult to define and keep track of the commit-
ment of the intermediate principals because in some
Fig. 11 Indirect Delegation Transaction.
cases, both delegatee and delegator will not be able to
get the information of intermediate principals of the
delegation chain in advance. So, it is not feasible to
define pre-delegation commitment for these entities. In-
stead, a generic “forward and keep-track” post-delegation
commitment should be enforced.
Thus, the intermediate principals have to commit
the following tasks:
– Notifying the previous delegatee after forwarding
the delegation assertion to the next delegatee in the
chain.
– Notifying the original delegator so that the delega-
tor can keep track of the development of the dele-
gation chain.
7 Delegation Commitment Exchange Protocol
This section proposes a basic protocol to achieve the
pre-delegation commitment of delegator and delegatee.
For the sake of simplicity, it assumes that the authen-
tication and authorisation mechanisms are already in
place. The verification of the identities of the involved
parties and the validation of the requests are assumed
to take place via well-understood PKI-based infrastruc-
ture.
7.1 Pre-delegation Commitment
Assume that there is a user who wants to access a re-
source via a service provider which he/she does not pos-
sess necessary privileges. The user (now is the delega-
tee) will have to ask another user, delegator, to dele-
gate him/her some certain privilege attributes. Figure
12 depicts the basic flow diagram for the concept of the
pre-delegation commitment.
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Fig. 12 Pre-delegation Commitment Exchanged.
7.1.1 Delegatee’s Pre-delegation Commitment
From the delegatee’s perspective, the delegatee will have
to do the following steps:
1. Delegatee starts the delegation process by sending
a request for delegation. This is just to inform the
delegator that the delegatee is asking for delegation.
2. The delegator will respond and ask for the commit-
ment of delegatee.
3. The delegatee now sends to the delegator an asser-
tion to express the following information:
– the task the delegatee wants to perform;
– the involved service provider;
– the necessary valid duration;
– the proposed security context and/or access con-
trol profile for the delegation transaction to al-
low the delegatee to suggest a security context
it is capable of using;
– if possible, in some cases, the necessary privilege
attributes suggested by the delegatee.
These factors form the pre-delegation commitment of
delegatee. This assertion will be kept by the delegator
for tracking purposes later.
7.1.2 Delegator’s Pre-delegation Commitment
The delegator will consequently assess the request. As-
sume that the delegator agrees to grant the request.
4. The delegator now can issue an assertion which con-
tains the following information:
– valid duration;
– security context of validation, for example only
valid for the service provider on domain D1 or
with service providers in the federation F1;
– confirmation upon finishing the use of delegation
assertion, if required.
These factors form the pre-delegation commitment
of delegator. This assertion, a commitment assertion,
will be kept by the delegator for tracking purposes later.
Fig. 13 Post-delegation Commitment Exchange.
By issuing this assertion, the delegator is now responsi-
ble for any verification requests related to this assertion
within the valid duration. It implies that if the verifica-
tion process needs the confirmation or any information
from the delegator, the delegator needs to respond as
part of its commitments.
5. Keeping track of the use of delegation assertion by
putting them into a tracking list. The list is the map-
ping of delegatee’s identity. This list will be stored
personally by the delegator. A storage mechanism
will be defined by the delegator or the delegator’s
system authority personally to preserve the auton-
omy of the federation.
6. The delegatee then has to confirm that it agrees
with this arrangement.
7.2 Post-delegation Commitment
After each service invocation, the involved parties need
to complete the commitment by doing the work which is
committed. In the post-delegation phase, the commit-
ment is mostly the responsibility of delegatee because
the delegator only needs to monitor and keep track of
the progress by waiting for the feedback from the dele-
gatee, the Service Provider and the Authorisation Au-
thority. Figure 13 depicts the basic flow diagram for the
concept of the post-delegation commitment.
1. The Authorisation Authority needs to let the dele-
gator know the delegated privilege attributes were
used. The Authorisation Authority will send the del-
egator and the Service Provider the assertion with
the following information:
– request from delegatee;
– timestamp of the request.
2. The Service Provider needs to let the delegator know
that the delegated privilege attributes were used.
The Service Provider will send the delegator the as-
sertion with the following information:
– request from delegatee;
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– timestamp of the request.
3. The delegatee needs to conduct the post-delegation
commitment. However, due to the trust relationship
with delegator, it does not need to report back to
the delegator.
4. The delegator needs to accept the confirmation from
both sides (service provider and authorisation au-
thority) and store the confirmations for tracking
purposes.
Due to the trust assumption in which delegatee is
not fully trusted by the delegator, there is no need for
the delegatee to report back to the delegator. The del-
egator will rely on the report from Authorisation Au-
thority and Service Provider for the tracking purpose.
7.3 Commitments of Intermediate Principal in
Indirect Delegation
In some cases, to achieve an objective, a more complex
collaboration between the involved entities is necessary.
Such process can evolve into a complex indirect dele-
gation chain. Recall the example of the business work
flow of preparing annual report, in which the CEO can
delegate part of this task to Marketing Manager, Finan-
cial Manager, and Technology Manager. These man-
agers, then, further delegate part of their tasks to the
lower level managers and subordinates. Therefore, as
discussed above, in an indirect delegation chain, the sit-
uation becomes more complicated with the involvement
of intermediate principals (or intermediaries) which act
as brokers between the original delegator and final del-
egatee.
In general, the indirect delegation process typically
happens in the following form: Delegator → 1st Inter-
mediate principal → . . .→ kth Intermediate principal
→ Delegatee. To simplify without degrading the gen-
erality, we have a look at the simplified scenario: Dele-
gator→ Intermediate principal→ Delegatee. From the
scenario above, we can say that there are two types of
relationships in the delegation tree:
– Delegator - Intermediate principal;
– Intermediary principal - Delegatee.
In indirect delegation, the original delegator dele-
gates certain capabilities/responsibilities to the inter-
mediate principal, the intermediate principal, then, del-
egates them to the final delegatee. Each step (each
transaction), as a single direct delegation transaction,
can be either dependent or independent of the others.
For example, the intermediate principal can get some
capabilities from the delegator and hold and use them
for a certain period. Then if requested by the delegatee,
the intermediate principal delegates them to the dele-
gatee. In some cases, the intermediate principal needs
to forward the token immediately upon receipt.
Therefore, in an indirect delegation, there are two
situations:
– The intermediate principal possesses and actually
uses the delegation token before forwarding (Case
1). In this case, each step (each transaction) is sim-
ilar to a single direct delegation transaction. There-
fore, the two transaction delegator - intermediate
principal and intermediate principal - delegatee can
be independent. So, under this context, the rela-
tionships of delegator - intermediary and interme-
diary - delegatee are the same as delegator - del-
egatee in direct delegation transactions discussed
above. In the above example, the intermediate prin-
cipal will play the role of the delegator and, then,
the delegatee. The only difference is with post del-
egation commitment as the intermediate principal
must commit to re-delegate the delegated capabili-
ties/responsibilities further if requested.
– The intermediate principal forwards the delegation
token without using it (Case 2). In the scenario
above, the intermediate principal does not really
concern about further delegation. However, in some
cases, immediate forwarding of the delegation token
is necessary. Let us have a look at the following sce-
nario. The CEO is preparing the annual report and
he/she wants to delegate part of the tasks to the
assistant. The company policies state that such del-
egate must not be made directly by the CEO but the
delegation must be monitored by a senior member
of the company board for security purposes. There-
fore, the CEO must forward the delegation to the
senior staff as a notification and ask the senior staff
to, then forward, to the final delegatee.
The main issue is the constraint of the workflow
which means the transaction needs to be channelled via
a third party (in this case, the senior staff - the broker)
before reaching the delegatee. Figure 14 presents the
generic scenario in which principal p1 in domain D1
wants to delegate to the principal pn in domain Dn. The
process can be completed via the intermediate principal
- the broker brk in domain Dk. p1 has to do transaction
with brk and then brk forwards the delegation to pn to
effectively complete the delegation process.
In this type of delegation, the pre-delegation and
post-delegation commitment are established and nego-
tiated by the delegator and the delegatee. The broker is
not involved with this negotiation process, and there-
fore, does not concern itself with about the commit-
ments of the delegator and the delegatee. In the generic
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Fig. 14 Indirect Delegation with Broker.
form, this is a four-stage process as depicted in Figure
14:
1. Initiating the pre-delegation commitment negotia-
tion between the delegator and delegatee.
2. The delegator sends token to the broker for forward-
ing.
3. The broker forwards the token.
4. The delegatee and the delegator perform post-delegation
commitment.
It is important to note that the intermediate princi-
pal brk, now the broker, is different to the intermediate
principal in Case 1. The main difference is that the bro-
ker does not exercise the delegated token; therefore it is
effectively not a delegatee in the delegation chain. Due
to this difference, in this case, the commitment of the
broker, delegator and delegatee will be quite different
to what was discussed in the previous direct delegation
commitment. In general, the broker is expected to for-
ward the delegation token to the next broker or to the
final delegator. However, as the broker will not utilise
the delegation token for service access, it is quite sim-
ple as the broker’s only commitment is to forward the
capability to the designated principal.
7.3.1 Pre-delegation Commitment
The pre-delegation commitment of the broker is straight-
forward. The only commitment of the broker is forward-
ing the delegation token to the next broker or the final
delegatee (Figure 15). This process involves only the
delegator and the broker.
1. The delegator sends the broker a forwarding request
to ask whether the broker is willing to take part in
the delegation chain.
Fig. 15 Pre-Delegation Commitment of the Broker.
Fig. 16 Post-Delegation Commitment of the Broker.
2. If the broker agrees, it sends back the acknowledge-
ment as its commitment to the course of action.
3. The delegator stores the commitment of the broker
for further reference.
4. The delegator sends back the acknowledgement to
the broker.
7.3.2 Post-delegation Commitment
This stage happens after the broker forwards the dele-
gation token to the next broker or the delegatee. This
process involves the delegator and the broker (Figure
16).
1. After forwarding the delegation token to the delega-
tee, the broker must notify the delegator about the
forwarding.
2. The delegator stores the notification for further ref-
erence.
3. The delegator acknowledges the notification to ef-
fectively complete a transaction with the broker.
It is important to note that even though there is a
forwarding transaction between the delegatee and the
broker, there is no commitment between the broker and
the delegatee.
8 Delegation Administration
In this section, four main operations of a delegation
transaction are discussed: delegation, re-delegation, re-
vocation, authorisation support. In addition, the aspect
of constraint management for each type of operation
will also be examined.
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8.1 Delegation and Re-delegation
The delegation creation is conducted based on the eval-
uation of four predicates: canDelegate, canIssue, canGrant,
canTransfer and canReceive. canReceive can be con-
sidered as an extra step because in optimistic dele-
gation, the delegator (the principal) is not concerned
whether the delegatee can receive the delegation and
therefore, the canReceive predicate may not be neces-
sary.
The following algorithm determines the outcome of
the predicates: canDelegate, canIssue, canGrant, canTransfer,
and canReceive. As the first four predicates are iden-
tical in terms of constraint management, it is consid-
ered that the algorithm applied for canDelegate can be
be applied for canIssue, canGrant and canTransfer.
These three predicates are implementation-dependent
and therefore can be subject to some additional im-
plementation constraint. It is important to note that
a constraint for issue function can only be evaluated
against the canIssue predicate. This can be enforced
by using the constraint profile (Section 9).
To successfully initiate a delegation transaction, the
following procedure is conducted.
– If the delegation is not conducted based on the del-
egator’s power but based on a previous delegation,
then this is a re-delegation. The algorithm needs to
retrieve the previous delegation tree and its associ-
ated constraint set.
– If this is not re-delegation, then the delegator cre-
ates its own constraint and/or retrieve applicable
constraints from the system authority.
– Verify the canDelegate predicate. If this is not an
optimistic delegation, then verify the canReceive
predicate.
– If this is a re-delegation constraint, retrieve the del-
egation tree which is applicable for the involved del-
egation.
– Modify the delegation tree by adding another node
into the tree to complete the delegation. The infor-
mation about the delegation tree and its associated
constraint set is controlled by the principal with the
root authority (the original delegator in case of re-
delegation).
The revocation constraint chain must be formed as
the delegation constraint chain is formed (via the del-
egation tree). For every delegation, a revocation con-
straint must be formed. It is similar to form the dele-
gation constraint chain. Therefore, the structure of the
revocation constraint chain must be identical to the del-
egation constraint chain. Figure 17 illustrates the dele-
gation and re-delegation procedure.
Fig. 17 Delegation and Re-delegation.
In delegation or re-delegation, it is important to dis-
cuss the issue of the delegation tree. The delegation tree
is used to manage the re-delegation from an original
delegation. All subsequent re-delegations must be con-
ducted with the authority less senior than the original
delegation.
Algorithm 8.1: FormDelegationTree(d(f)) Algo-
rithm - Construct a delegation tree for a delega-
tion transaction.
input : d(f) is the to-be delegation.
output : δ where d(f) ∈ δ and δ.au is the root authority.
δ = Ø1
Retrieve all delegation tree D∗2
/* Check to see if it is re-delegation by
retrieving and comparing against all previous
delegations */
foreach delegation tree δi ∈ D∗ do3
foreach delegation dj(fj) ∈ δi do4
if re-delegation based on dj(fj) then5
δ = δi6
Add a new branch on the delegation tree to7
represent d(f) where d(f) is a child of dj(fj)
return δ8
end9
end10
end11
/* if not re-delegation, then create new
delegation tree */
if δ = Ø then12
δ = δ ∪ d(f)13
return δ14
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Algorithm 8.1 plays an important role in the archi-
tecture. The primary objective of the algorithm is to
retrieve all delegation trees known to the system au-
thority at that point in time and return the tree that
contains the input delegation. The root authority of the
delegation in question can be retrieved from the out-
put delegation tree. This process is designed to support
the authorisation support operation. The algorithm is
called every time an authorisation support request or
a delegation request is conducted. The main point is
to allow the involved users and authority, to some ex-
tent, to know where the delegation comes from. In other
words, the algorithm is utilised to pin-point the source
of the delegation. From the graph theory perspective,
the reduction process is actually a graph search. The
search compares the input delegation with each node
of every delegation tree until a tree with a matched
node is found.
Algorithm 8.3 and 8.2 describe how delegation can
be created and verified. The procedure of verifying for
canReceive is similar to the one for canDelegate. After
successful delegation, if this is a re-delegation, the del-
egator must notify the principal with root authority to
update the delegation tree. It is important to note that,
usually after a delegation, the delegator or the original
delegator should specify constraints for execution and
revocation. If not, then there is no control over these
two operations.
Algorithm 8.2: canDelegate(d(f), σ) Algorithm -
Verify the canDelegate predicate.
input : d(f) is the to-be delegation and σ is the set of
constraints for the delegation.
output : true if delegation is allowed, false otherwise.
foreach constraint c ∈ σ do1
if d(f) fails to meet c then2
return false3
end4
return true5
8.2 Authorisation Support
In the authorisation support operation, there is no change
of the delegation tree or the associated constraint set.
This simplifies the management effort of the operation.
The main objective of this operation is to collect the
necessary information of delegation, the delegation tree
Algorithm 8.3: Delegation(d(f)) Algorithm - Fa-
cilitate a delegation transaction.
input : d(f) as the to-be delegation.
output : The delegation tree and the associated
constraint sets are constructed.
Retrieve all applicable constraint from the authorities and1
the delegator σ∗
if canDelegate(d(f), σ∗) = false then2
return3
if delegation is optimistic and canReceive(d(f), σ∗) =4
false then
return5
δ = FormDelegationTree(d(f))6
foreach constraint ci ∈ σ∗ do7
if ci.scsp  d(f).de then8
σ = ScopeAndEffectReduction(σ, c)9
end10
and associated constraint set and feed this information
to the appropriate XACML modules for processing.
When enforcing a request using delegation, the au-
thority only needs to ensure that the delegation as-
sociated with this request comes from an authorised
principal (the principal would be authorised if conduct-
ing the request itself). Therefore, if the authority can
trace the original authority of the delegation back to an
authorised principal, the request would be honoured.
In this operation, the canExecute predicate needs to
be verified. If this predicate is verified, it means that
the delegation is qualified for use (to request an ac-
cess permission). Similar to the algorithm to verify the
canDelegate and canReceive predicate, to verify the
canExecute predicate, only constraints which are desig-
nated for governing the execution of a delegation trans-
action are considered. The procedure for verifying canExecute
is similar to the one applied for canDelegate discussed
above.
8.3 Revocation
The revocation is based on the canRevoke predicate.
The process for revocation includes the following steps.
These steps are illustrated in Algorithm 8.4 and 8.5.
– Retrieving all delegation trees associated with the
targeted delegation.
– Identifying the tree containing the target delegation.
– Verifying any constraints that are imposed on the
revocation process to check the canRevoke predi-
cate (the procedure is similar to the one applied for
canDelegate discussed above).
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– Removing appropriate delegation nodes. When the
revocation is completed for the root authority (the
top node of the tree), the whole delegation tree is
revoked.
Algorithm 8.4: canRevoke(d(f)) Algorithm - Ver-
ify the canRevoke predicate.
input : d(f) is the targeted delegation and σ is the set
of constraints for that delegation.
output : true if revocation is allowed, false otherwise.
foreach returned revocation constraint c in σ do1
if d(f) fails to meet c then2
return false3
end4
return true5
Algorithm 8.5: Revocation(d(f)) Algorithm - Fa-
cilitate the revocation.
input : d(f) is the targeted delegation.
output : Appropriate nodes of the delegation tree will
be removed.
if canRevoke(d(f)) then1
Contact the authority and retrieve all delegation tree2
D∗
foreach returned delegation tree δi ∈ D∗ do3
if f ∈ δi then4
Remove d(f) from δi5
Remove all branches which are children of6
d(f)
end7
end8
end9
In our approach, revocation can be achieved in a
simple way compared to others such as Yao et al. [19],
Tamasia et al. [17] or Wang and Osborn [18]. Basically,
it is because all the control of the delegation tree rests
with the root authority. As discussed above, if the au-
thority can not trace a delegation back to an autho-
rised principal, the request is not honoured. So, to re-
voke or in other words to dishonour a request using a
delegation, it is only necessary to disconnect the del-
egation from the root authority to make the trace of
authority impossible. This feature is a significant con-
tribution because it is not necessary to remove the sub-
sequent branch. This improves the effectiveness of the
Fig. 18 Revocation.
whole mechanism. This is possible due to the enforce-
ment mechanism in which all the re-delegation must be
traced back to the root authority. The convenience in
revocation is paid via the cost of managing the delega-
tion tree information of the root authority.
In our approach, the root authority must be noti-
fied to update the tree. There is no need for the sub-
sequent delegatees to know about that. Because after
the revocation, all subsequent delegation are rendered
ineffective. Notifying the subsequent entities in the del-
egation tree is optional and can be done to increase the
situation awareness.
The advantage of the approach in revocation is that
there is no need for a cascading approach which is very
computationally expensive. Every time there is an revo-
cation request, there are only two things to do. Firstly,
check the authority and the delegation constraint. Sec-
ondly, if they match, remove the whole delegation con-
straint chain. By doing so, the corresponding delegation
is effectively revoked. In Figure 18, Frank can not use
the delegation from David any more after revocation.
In addition, it should be noted that revocation due to
violation of a specified constraint is also not necessary
because the delegation is simply not honoured if the
canExecute predicate is not verified. Also, as some ap-
proaches have a depth for revocation, it is not really
practical for a limited or partial revocation and not
utilised by the model. The main reason is that, all re-
delegation is based on the additional power received
from a previous delegation. If the previous delegation
(the base) is revoked, there is no base for the current
delegation to exist. Therefore, it must be revoked too.
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9 Delegation, Constraint Profile and XACML
Integration
In this section, the issues of integration the constraint
management and delegation capability into XACML
are discussed. XACML is chosen due to its flexibility,
expressiveness and wide adoption. To effectively inte-
grate into XACML, a profile for constraint is proposed
based on the existing XACML vocabulary and process
model. In the constraint profile, a new set of elements
is designed to carry the constraint’s information such
as principal, sub-principal, target and boundary. Due
to the unique approach for delegation of the model, a
new set of elements are also needed to express the in-
formation about the delegation tree. A set of examples
is also provided to illustrate the new elements. It is im-
portant to note that the examples are non-normative
and are written in a pseudo-XACML format. In addi-
tion to the new elements, this section also discusses how
the model can interact with XACML modules such as
Policy Administration Point (PAP), Policy Information
Point (PIP) and Policy Decision Point (PDP).
9.1 Delegation Constraint Profile
This section provides a profile for expressing and enforc-
ing the constraints of the involved parties in the dele-
gation process. In this section, XACML will be used
as the means to carry information in the delegation
negotiation process. XACML has been selected due to
its expressiveness and the compatibility with various
standards and implementations such as Shibboleth and
Liberty Alliance.
XACML provides a wide range of syntax and pro-
tocol for addressing different types of constraints which
can cope with the demands of the delegation process.
In fact, the normative standards of XACML do not of-
ficially support delegation (except the draft of XACML
v3.0 Administration and Delegation profile). However,
despite the flexibility and compatibility of XACML,
XACML does not attract much attention from the re-
search community in terms of expressing constraint and
delegation. The profile is necessary because, while XACML
v3.0 Administration and Delegation profile can express
constraints, the approach of XACML v3.0 is not effi-
cient as discussed in Section 2.
In a very simple format, the constraint profile should
be able to the following information:
– principal;
– sub-principal;
– constraint target;
– boundary;
– the relationship of a constraint and a delegation pro-
cess;
– an indicator of combining algorithm for the PDP to
enforce if necessary as discussed in Section 5.3.
In addition to this constraint information, for the
purpose of maintaining information about the delega-
tion tree, the profile should also be able to express the
following information:
– delegator;
– delegatee;
– delegation method (issue, grant or transfer);
– the relationship of one delegation to another;
– the relationship of a delegation and a constraint set.
As a boundary is, in fact, a statement which is
based on an expressive language using attributes, bi-
nary and numerical operators to define the acceptable
operational boundaries for the constraint targets, cur-
rent XACML elements are enough to express such in-
formation. In order to express this information, some
additional elements are introduced:
– < DelegationAndConstraintProfile/ >: This is a
master element of the whole profile.
– < Constraint/ >: This is the master element to
indicate a constraint.
– < ConstraintID/ >: To indicate a unique ID for
each constraint. This element is used to link a con-
straint to a delegation.
– < Principal/ >: To carry information of the con-
straint principal. The value of this element can be
left blank to indicate the federation authority.
– < Sub − principal/ >: To carry information of the
constraint sub-principal.
– < ConstraintType/ >: To indicate the operation in
which the constraint intends to be placed on. The
potential values of this element include delegate,
issue, grant, transfer, revoke and execute.
– < Target/ >: This element is re-used from the ex-
isting Target element of XACML.
– < ConstraintCombiningAlgorithm/ >: This ele-
ment is designed to address the concern of conflicted
scope and effect. This element can be used by both
the PDP or a normal user if they want to evaluate
the potentially conflicted constraints. The values of
this element include deny-override, permit-override,
first-applicable and only-one-applicable. It should be
noted that this element is not associated with a spe-
cific constraint. It is associated with a delegation
tree and controlled by the delegator with the root
authority.
– < Delegation/ >: This is the master element to
indicate a delegation.
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– < DelegationID/ >: To indicate a unique ID for
each delegation. This element is used to link a del-
egation to a constraint set.
– < Delegator/ >: To indicate a delegator.
– < Delegatee/ >: To indicate a delegatee.
– < DelegationMethod/ >: This element is used to
applied correct constraints to correct delegation op-
eration (together with < ConstraintType/ >). The
values of this element include issue, grant and transfer.
– < MaxDelegationDepth >: This element is part of
the draft of XACML v3.0 Administration and Del-
egation profile. The element is used as a constraint
to limit the depth of delegation tree. The element is
include for the sake of completeness. In practice, a
delegation tree is controlled by the demand, not the
pre-defined ideality of how much depth the delega-
tion tree should have.
– < DelegationTree/ >: This element is used to indi-
cate the delegation tree in which the top node pos-
sesses the root authority.
– < DelegationTreeID/ >: This is the unique ele-
ment to indicate a delegation tree.
9.2 XACML Integration
There are two issues which are worth discussing:
– Question 1: Where to store the information about
delegation tree and the associated constraint set?
What is the arrangement to retain and distribute
delegation tree and associated constraint sets infor-
mation?
– Question 2: What happens if the delegation is be-
ing modified and some operation require to retrieve
the information of the tree and the associated con-
straints?
To answer Question 1, let’s have a look at the mech-
anism of initiating delegation or re-delegation. After a
successful delegation initiation, the delegator (in case of
delegation) or the original delegator with root authority
(in case of re-delegation) needs to build and maintain
a delegation tree and an associated constraint set. The
delegation tree and the constraint set are built as the
means to maintain the chain of authority over the dele-
gation tree and all individual delegation within the tree.
To do that, the creator of the delegation tree maintains
precise information about the relationship of one del-
egation to another within the delegation tree and the
associated constraint sets. This requires the creator of
the tree to have knowledge about the unique ID of each
delegation transaction and each constraint. Therefore,
if we let the model act independently with the PAP
and the PIP and the principal without root authority
creates and stores the delegation tree on its own, the
creator of the tree may not have the capability to ac-
quire such unique IDs.
As a result, it is more reasonable for the model to
allow the principal with root authority to store the in-
formation about the delegation tree and the associated
constraint set on the PAP under the form of a policy.
It is important to note that though the delegation tree
and the associated constraint set are stored at the PAP,
the principal with the root authority is still the owner of
the information. The advantage of this approach is that
XACML does not need to modify its components (PAP
and PIP). Delegation information and constraints can
be retrieved natively from the PAP when the Context
Handler deals with a request. By using this approach,
the model can utilise the capability of retrieving policies
of XACML from multiple distributed PAP.
As an alternative, the model can perform all these
functions via direct communication with the Context
Handler. This alternative has the advantage of less com-
munication between the model and the Context Han-
dler and more independence for the model. However,
the model needs to perform certain overlap functions
with the PAP and the PIP which is not desirable since
the model is designed to be a complement to XACML,
not to replace it. Therefore, the former arrangement is
still the favourable option. Figure 19 presents the inte-
gration of the model to XACML using the arrangement
in which the model communicates with XACML via the
PAP and the PIP.
Question 2 poses an interesting issue. The issue needs
a mechanism to manage the access to the resource in
question (the delegation tree and the associated con-
straint set). The mechanism is necessary to help avoid
a “race” condition which can lead to “dead-lock”. This
issue is discussed and addressed by various works [13]
and out of scope of this paper.
10 Discussion
In Section 2, two principle functional requirements for
the model are proposed:
– Constraint expression;
– Constraint tracking and maintainability;
An important part of the first requirement is to al-
low the constraint to be associated with, not just the
resource but the action that affects the resource. This
function can be achieved via the appropriate utilisation
of the target and boundary element when constructing
a constraint. As, in this paper, the constraint is de-
fined as a 4-tuple of principal, sub-principal, target and
boundary, the association of a constraint and an action
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Fig. 19 Integration of Constraint Management Model to
XACML.
can be captured by wrapping the action within the tar-
get. In addition, as discussed in Section 4.1, the scope
of a constraint can also be captured by via the target
(target scope) and sub-principal (sub-principal scope).
Additional effect can be added by evaluating the con-
straint authority. The model also includes a scope re-
duction algorithm for constraint evaluation purpose.
The first requirement is also addressed by the XACML-
based constraint profile (Section 9) and the way in which
a constraint can be constructed (Section 4.1). As previ-
ously mentioned, the model provides the capability to
express the constraint information via a set of XACML-
based syntax. This profile includes additional elements
to carry constraint information and the relationship
of constraints to the associated delegation. The main
motivation for constructing the model is that other
approaches such as the XACML v3.0 Administration
and Delegation profile do not have the capability to
express constraints and capture the relationships be-
tween delegations. The approach in the paper is novel
in terms of recognising the relationship between the del-
egation transactions and between the constraints and
their elements. In existing approaches, a constraint is
only recognised against a task and role to execute this
task (if in a role based environment).
In the second requirement, it is vital to maintain
constraint information when the transaction moves across
security domains. This function is principally achieved
by four components: the delegation tree, authority tree
(Section 4.3), the constraint profile and the commit-
ment exchange protocol (Section 7). The first three
components provide the means to carry delegation and
constraint information, while the fourth component pro-
vides a means for exchanging information. The utilisa-
tion of delegation tree/authority tree (via the tracking
algorithms) and the constraint profile is the backbone
of the model. Information about a particular delegation
transaction and the associated constraints can be cross
referenced from the delegation tree to the constraint
profile. Even if the delegation moves across security do-
mains, the referencing mechanism is still able to cope as
all involved entities in the delegation transaction have
a common knowledge of the delegation tree. When it
is necessary to update delegation and constraint infor-
mation (for example, a new re-delegation happens), the
exchange protocol is utilised to fulfil the task.
The exchange protocol is discussed within the con-
text of user commitment in both direct and indirect
delegation. The protocol provides a simple mechanism
to monitor, keep track of and exchange the commit-
ment of the involved parties when requesting a dele-
gation for a particular task. This paper introduced a
mechanism to help the parties involved in the delega-
tion process to express commitment constraints, per-
form the commitments and track the committed actions
by exchanging the necessary information. The mech-
anism looked at two different aspects: pre-delegation
commitment and post-delegation commitment. In pre-
delegation commitment, the mechanism enables the in-
volved parties to express the delegation constraints and
address those constraints. The post-delegation commit-
ment phase enables those parties to inform the delega-
tor and service providers about how the commitments
are conducted. One of the advantages of the proposed
scheme is that, via the pre- and post-delegation com-
mitment of the involved parties, it supports optimistic
delegation wherein the delegator simply assumes that
the delegation will succeed - it does not ask the au-
thorisation authority in advance to confirm that the
delegation will be effective. If the delegation fails, the
delegation commitment exchange protocol provides a
way of recording, identifying, reporting and correcting
the problem. Therefore, optimistic delegation may be
more efficient as it does not require pre-approval of the
authority.
In general, this paper proposed a clear and simple
mechanism in terms of delegation and constraint ad-
ministration. The mechanism allows the federation to
keep track and trace back any delegation transaction
and so be able to maintain a precise authorisation state
of user at a given time. However, the mechanism lacks
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the capability to check for the constraints and resolve
the conflicts between delegated privilege attributes and
between the delegated privileges with the involved poli-
cies. The mechanism also ignored the delegatee’s role
constraint and conflict resolution as it does not mention
how the delegated privilege attributes will fit into the
current privilege attribute set of the delegatee. The task
of keeping track of the commitment and verification
may present scalability challenges. When the number of
intermediate parties grows large, the protocol will be-
come complex with many delegation assertions needing
to be exchanged. By addressing the issue of delegation
commitment and proposing a scheme to monitor and
keep track of the commitments of the involved parties,
we can greatly improve the flexibility of the delegation
process and so the flexibility of the whole access control
process of the organisation. The main purpose of the
protocol is to introduce a simple environment for en-
tities to communicate to perform delegation. Although
the current model can solve the foundation issues of
user delegation commitments, there are some aspects of
the current approach that can be improved. It is neces-
sary to further evaluate and improve the simplicity of
the mechanism in the context of long indirect delega-
tion chains. The issue of keeping track of commitments
can also lead to the investigation of the issue of trust of
access control via delegation. In addition, future work
should also extend the security context and consider
the commitment of other involved parties such as del-
egation authority, identity provider and authentication
and authorisation authority.
Integration of the model into XACML is also an
interesting issue. In theory, the model can answer to
the PDP, the PAP, the PIP and the Context Handler.
Making the model answer to the Context Handler is
necessary in case the tracing of authority is necessary.
This is because the Context Handler is the only place
in the XACML model where the credentials of the in-
volved entities are known. The same type of information
is available if the model answers to the PDP. However,
it would be inefficient to make the PDP go through an-
other information retrieving step before being able to
make an access control decision. Similar reasoning ex-
cludes the integration of the model though the Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP). The PIP can be an alter-
native integration point for the model. However, if the
model is structured as the additional component to the
PIP, the only information available to the model is the
information of the resources as well as other contextual
data from the environment and possible policy informa-
tion concerning the involved constraints (if the model
is connected to the PAP). The nature of the connec-
tion between the constraint management model and the
PAP is slightly different to other modules. As the PAP
acts as the policy feeder for the PDP, the model, in this
relationship, acts as the feeder to the PDP. It is nec-
essary because if the model acquires new constraints
from the delegators and the delegatee, the newly up-
dated constraints need to be passed to the PAP so that
they can be later honoured by the PDP via the decision
making process. It should be noted that the connec-
tions of the constraint management model and the PAP,
the PIP and the Context Handler are duplex because
sometimes, it is necessary for the constraint manage-
ment model to acquire information from the PIP and
the PAP to facilitate the delegation transaction. The
advantage of having the model called by the Context
Handler is that existing XACML modules such as the
PEP, PIP and PAP, do not need to change. In this
case, only the Context Handler of the XACML imple-
mentation needs to be modified [10] and the most im-
portant XACML module, the PDP will remain intact.
This will greatly increase the interoperability of the ac-
cess control decision making process involving differ-
ent PDPs. This approach, similar to other models [10],
supports multiple security domains efficiently as each
security domain can be added to applications without
the application logic needing to change. As the model
is designed as an additional referencing point to an ex-
isting access control model, it is not the intention for
the model to replace any modules that currently exist
within the XACML model.
Despite being able to address the functional require-
ments, it is important to note that the model is built
based on two assumptions (Section 5): the ability to
perform transaction-constraint mapping and the avail-
ability of a common hierarchy for seniority of authority.
The former is one of the important functions of many
ERP systems. Therefore, despite its importance to the
functionality of the whole model, it is not vital as the
model is designed to work with other systems and there-
fore, can borrow this capability. However, it is more se-
rious if a common hierarchy can not be achieved. The
model would not be functional if this assumption fails.
The assumption of utilisation of a common hier-
archy in constructing the constraint management ap-
proach is a serious issue. As part of the purpose of
the model is to evaluate constraints against each other
based on the seniority of elements such as authority
(principal), scope of sub-principal and scope of target,
it is important to determine and compare the elements
using a common hierarchy. In the model, the algorithms
to determine the root authority and reduce constraint
effect and scope also need a common hierarchy to func-
tion properly. For transactions within a single security
domain, this is not a difficult issue. However, with cross
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security domain transactions, it is difficult to determine
the seniority of two elements from two different secu-
rity domains. There are certain efforts in achieving this
capability such as synchronising user attributes across
member domains of the federation. However, automat-
ically constructing a common hierarchy is challenging.
It is important to recognise that the common hierar-
chy, at the moment, may only be achieved via manually
pre-defined configurations of the member domains. Au-
tomatic negotiation may only be able to construct part
of the common hierarchy via certain pre-defined rules.
As exceptions often exist, therefore, it can be said that
there is no efficient solution to automatically negotiate
and achieve a common hierarchy. The core problem,
which is a common understanding of the synchronised
attributes, is still a big question. The nature of this
problem is not really security but rather data and or-
ganisation management. This is a long-standing issue
within the context of federated systems and requires
inputs from not only technical efforts but also organ-
isational studies. This issue has wide ranging implica-
tion and can be applied for various practical scenarios
in different areas such as government inter-agency col-
laboration, grid computing and business process man-
agement. While theoretically, it is reasonable to have
this assumption, the practicality of the model and so
the whole model depends on this assumption.
The assumption of transaction-constraint mapping
also provides the ground for further investigation. As
previously discussed, there are several approaches or
commercial products which can provide this function.
However, it is necessary to discuss the issues from the
implementation perspective, for example, protocol and
interface for request and response from the principal
to the authority and interoperability between the ap-
proaches. In addition, in the paper, as mentioned be-
fore, the model is designed to prevent the conflicted con-
straints from being associated with a delegation trans-
action. If there is a conflict, the constraint in question
will be rejected and as a result, the operations (dele-
gation, re-delegation, revocation or authorisation sup-
port) may also be rejected. This approach is sound from
the theoretical and security perspective. However, in
the real world, it is not practical if the model continues
to reject. It would be better if the model can provide
a more flexible and suggestive result via a resolution
mechanism. For example, it can reject if there is con-
flict but at the same time, advise the involved entities
in the delegation process about the conflict and suggest
them to resolve the conflict by approaching an author-
ity for further constraint relaxation or by reducing the
scope and/or the power of the delegation.
Again, the idea of choosing conflict prevention rather
than conflict resolution is sensible in terms of security.
However, in terms of practicality and operational per-
spective, it may not be a good design. In the real world,
it is not feasible to just prevent the conflict. There is
always a demand for a resolution mechanism. For ex-
ample, it can be a resolution authority so that when
there is a conflict, the delegation mechanism can refer
to this authority to ask for relaxation of certain policies
(which cause the conflict). At the moment, the model
does not offer this capability and therefore, it is left as
an area for future work.
11 Conclusion
This paper proposed a mechanism to manage the del-
egation process and its constraints. As every delega-
tion transaction is associated with a certain set of con-
straints, the mechanism is the solution for a long-standing
issue of how to effectively manage and enforce con-
straints, particularly when the constraints are distributed
or come from different security domains. The paper
proposed a mechanism to manage and prevent poten-
tial conflicts from happening when adding more con-
straints into an existing constraint set. The mechanism
was built a formal foundation of a set of definitions of
constraint properties, operations, functions and predi-
cates. The paper also discussed the issues of delegation
commitment as a special type of constraint and pro-
posed a basic protocol to exchange the commitment to
allow the involved entities in the delegation transaction
to achieve a common context for the transaction. A
simple case study is presented to illustrate the model.
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